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Under the current Polish government, Polish-German relations seem to be deteriorating. However, the divergence
of national interests is not the core of the problem. The main reason for this development is the fact that a
nationalistic, right-wing Polish government defines its identity in opposition to Germany, aspiring to copy the
Hungarian model of majoritarian illiberal democracy. Due to their size and the significance of the bilateral
relationship in the EU, divergence between Poland and Germany will not be limited to a bilateral dimension, as it
will also carry implications for the rest of Europe. And on top of that, the vote for Brexit will likely cause the current
lukewarm attitude of Poland's new government towards the European Union (EU) to shift to open Euroscepticism. 
BACKGROUND
The Law and Justice Party, immediately after winning a parliamentary majority in the October 2015 elections,
launched a policy called "Good Change" which closely follows the Hungarian model of majoritarian illiberal
democracy identified by Freedom House as a gradual authoritarian slide. 
The "Good Change" began with a law that seriously limited the competences of the Polish Constitutional Court.
According to the ruling of the Constitutional Court, this new law violates the constitution on several points.
However, the Polish government has refused to implement the Court's ruling. 
The "Good Change" policy was met with a strong reaction from EU institutions. In January 2016 the European
Commission launched, for the first time ever, a structured dialogue with Poland under the Rule of Law Framework.
In April 2016, the European Parliament voted with an overwhelming majority on a resolution calling the Polish
government to implement the verdict of the Constitutional Court. The Law and Justice Party managed to gather only
20% of votes against the resolution, mostly from other nationalistic and Eurosceptic parties which are outside the
European mainstream. The main defenders of the Polish government were the British Conservative Party and the
Hungarian Fidesz. Finally, on 1 June 2016, the European Commission issued a negative opinion on the Rule of Law
situation in Poland. 
Even the United States has distanced itself from the Polish government, as it did in the case of Hungary. The internal
politics of the current Polish government was labelled anti-democratic by prominent US Senators (e.g. John
McCain, the Republican presidential candidate in 2008) and former US President Bill Clinton. 
Certainly, some of the criticism directed towards the new Polish government was unfair and exaggerated (a coup
d'état, comparisons to the communist regime or Putin), yet the Law and Justice Party is vehemently rejecting any
criticism launched against it. Indeed, the Polish ruling elite reacted harshly to Western critics, in a way that would
have been unthinkable just a couple of years ago. 
The German media are particularly strong in their criticism of Poland's Good Change, while key German
politicians, including Angela Merkel, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Sigmar Gabriel or Wolfgang Schäuble, have shown
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restraint and refrained from publicly criticising the Polish government. Yet, the Law and Justice Party has focused its
counteroffensive specifically on Germany. Their preoccupation with Germany stems from the fact that Jaroslaw
Kaczynski, the head of the Law and Justice Party, perceives Germany as the main "other", in opposition to which he
is trying to rebuild the Polish national identity. Not accidentally, a radical deterioration of Polish-German relations
also occurred during the previous period when the Law and Justice Party was in power (2005-2007).
Between 2007 and 2015, Poland and Germany experienced a considerable enhancement of cooperation in all
spheres. Poland strengthened its status as a key economic and political partner of Germany in the EU behind
France and the United Kingdom, and almost on an equal footing with Italy. Yet, the significance of Poland for
Germany is still insufficiently recognised in both countries and in Europe. Poland's share in Germany's trade
turnover has increased substantially in recent years and is approaching 5%.1 Poland has become Germany's
seventh most important trade partner in the world and the fifth in the EU; Poland is about to surpass Italy as it is
close to becoming Germany's fourth main trading partner in the EU. German foreign direct investment (FDI) in
Poland is also just slightly smaller than German FDI in Italy. German investments in Poland have contributed
significantly to the strong performance of the German industrial sector during the global economic crisis. Poland's
favourable conditions for doing business provided German companies with competitive advantages on the global
stage. At the same time, Polish companies began playing a stronger role in Germany's value chains as sub-
contractors of the German industrial machine.
Social ties between Poles and Germans are also very well developed. At least 15% of the German population
historically originate from Poland.2 Every day, hundreds of thousands of Poles and Germans cross the border between
the two countries. Around 20% of Poles are fluent in German, the highest share after the Dutch among EU states.
The increasing ties also resulted in a substantial improvement of mutual perceptions of both nations. For instance,
according to opinion polls conducted regularly since the beginning of the 1990s, sympathy of Poles towards Germans
reached the highest level (almost 45%) and antipathy dropped to the historical lowest level (slightly above 20%).3
However, the positive attitude of Poles towards Germans remains fragile and even started to curdle this year. The
Polish-German relationship has not managed to cross the Rubicon and move to the next stage. A key reason for this
relates to the fact that the previous Polish government was not able to convince its public that the country should
join the eurozone. Despite very close economic ties, many Polish citizens mostly identify the common currency
with problems related to the 'eurocrisis' and not with potential economic benefits. Undoubtedly, Polish accession
would have been a strong sign of confidence in the common currency, bringing a large and very dynamic economy
into the euro area for the first time since 1999. It could have also encouraged other Central European states to join
the common currency.
STATE OF PLAY
The substantial increase of political, economic and social ties between Poland and Germany was met with serious
anxiety in the leadership of the Law and Justice Party. Germany occupies a central negative place in Jaroslaw
Kaczynski's ideological worldview. In his attitude towards Germany, Kaczynski is an inheritor of Roman
Dmowski, the father of Polish nationalism who perceived Germans as eternal and existential enemies of Poles. In
his political statements, Kaczynski pays much more attention to Germany than Russia. He perceives Germany as
a bigger threat to Polish national identity than Russia because of its civilisational attractiveness and economic
potential. According to Kaczynski, Germany constitutes a multidimensional "soft" threat linked to multi-
culturalism and civic nationalism as opposed to traditional Polish culture based on ethnic nationalism and
conservative Roman-Catholicism.4
At the same time, Kaczynski's attitude towards Germany is full of contradictions. For instance, while feeling
threatened by German power, he considers Germany as an exemplification of the decay of Europe. The
declarations of German politicians, including Angela Merkel's statement that "Islam belongs to Germany", or the
Willkommenskultur to refugees are perceived very negatively by Kaczynski. According to him, Germany pushes
for the relocation of Muslim refugees to Poland in order to water down the Polish ethnic homogeneity and to
impose multiculturalism on the country. 
The Law and Justice Party believes that an economic symbiosis between Poland and Germany is a blind alley and
a recipe for Poland to fall into the middle income trap. Poland will thus get stuck at a level of economic
development below the one of Western European countries, thereby petrifying Poland's status as Germany's
economic subcontractor and a reservoir of cheap labour. Moreover, they believe that the asymmetric character of
 
this relationship is transforming Poland into Germany's political and economic vassal.5 Law and Justice politicians
do not recognise that the Czech Republic established an even closer economic relationship with Germany and
managed to rapidly increase the innovativeness of its economy, leaving Poland far behind.6
Most importantly, Kaczynski perceives Germany as the main threat to Poland's sovereignty, simultaneously
conflating his own party interests and Polish national interests in external affairs. The internal consolidation of the
Law and Justice Party's power, achieved through a severe limitation of judicial authority is treated as a
precondition to strengthen Polish influence on the international arena. Therefore, the Law and Justice Party
considers any external criticism of its government policy as an attack against Poland's sovereignty and by default
its position in the world.
On the other hand, Germany is very sensitive to the issue of rule of law (Rechtstaat). This is exemplified by the
crucial role played by the Federal Constitutional Court in the German political system. As the Polish-German
Professor Klaus Bachmann noticed, "an attempt to paralyse its own Constitutional Court is something no German
will ever understand. No one can imagine what would happen if a German government dared to do that. This is
even hard to imagine that any government could do that."7 In other words, the "Good Change" is viewed in
Germany as a worrisome anomaly and puts Poland and Germany almost on an inevitable collision course.
In order to stoke anti-German fears, Kaczynski often exploits historical arguments. He declares that Germany
wants to subdue Poland because it dreams of the territories lost to Poland after the Second World War. Someday,
Kaczynski believes Germany might realise its dreams and "we will wake up in a smaller Poland".8 Therefore, for
Kaczynski, German investments in Poland pose a direct threat to the country's security. Hence, it should come as
no surprise that Kaczynski stated that the 2015 elections brought the liberation of Poland from Germany's
tutelage. Until then, Poland was a German colony.9 According to him, politicians in the Polish opposition accept
Poland's submission to German domination due to their own personal interests. 
Jaroslaw Kaczynski has compared the German media criticism of his party to the Soviet intervention in Hungary
in 1956 and the current Germany to the Weimar Republic, which evolved into the Nazi regime.10 Kaczynski has
also declared that the German government stands behind the media criticism. His Minister of Internal Affairs was
even more outspoken in attacking German politicians. He did not allow them to criticize Poland, recalling that
German state officials destroyed Warsaw in 1944, killing 50,000 Poles in three days in one city district.11 In the
Law and Justice Party's discourse, Germany is quite often presented as a traditional ally of Russia who, together
with Moscow, wants to divide Poland – as had happened several times in the past. In fact, when Kaczynski was in
the opposition, he often referred to the risk of Poland as a German-Russian condominium.
The negative attitude of the Law and Justice Party towards Germany reverberates on the Polish government's views
of the EU. The increase of German leverage in Europe after 2008 strengthened the identification of the EU with
Germany in the Law and Justice Party discourse. It believes that Germany is also standing behind the EU criticism
of the Polish government. In order to counterbalance the German predominance in the Union, at the beginning of
2016, Poland announced that the United Kingdom will replace Germany as the most important partner for Poland
in the EU. This replacement was strongly related to a particular vision of Europe shared with Eurosceptic forces in
the UK.12 According to the current Polish government, EU integration went too far and should be reversed. The EU
should be turned into a very loose association of very strong sovereign nation states – a vision of Europe not
widely shared in Germany.
PROSPECTS
The importance of the Polish-German relationship for the EU and the worrying internal trajectory of Poland, the
sixth largest member state of the EU, mean that the exacerbation of tensions between Berlin and Warsaw will likely
have wider European implications. A deep deterioration of relations should be treated as a probable scenario as the
Law and Justice Party appears very determined to follow Victor Orbán's path towards illiberal democracy.
The EU will put the Polish government under pressure through the Rule of Law mechanism and the European
Parliament is planning to pass the next resolution concerning the situation in Poland.13 Yet, this strategy may not
work. The Polish parliament has already passed or is going to endorse several laws (including a police bill, anti-
terrorist law, farmland bill, media law, judiciary law, law on prosecutor's office), which the Polish ombudsman is
submitting to the Constitutional Court and evaluating as unconstitutional. As a consequence, the decline of Polish
democracy could become so serious that key German and other European politicians will be under pressure to
decide on how to react against the further "Orbanisation" of Poland.
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Kaczynski holds that Poland can afford to confront Germany and others because it is about four times stronger
than Hungary in terms of the size of its economy and population, and Berlin and Brussels will be preoccupied
with many other challenges. At the same time, since Poland is economically and politically more important than
Hungary, there is a risk that the "Orbanisation" of the country could be an additional source of inspiration for
other populists in the EU.
Moreover, the withdrawal of the UK from the EU may have serious implications for the scale of Polish-German
tensions. The current Polish government saw Britain as its main ally to counterbalance Germany's "domination" in
the EU. Hence, a Brexit could lead to an even more substantial decrease of EU attractiveness for the current Polish
government. The Law and Justice Party is likely to move towards more Eurosceptic positions and the idea of
following the UK path may even appear on the political agenda of the Law and Justice Party. In this case, Poland
might entrench its status as an enfant terrible – one of the main troublemakers – through gradually marginalising
and isolating itself. Such a development would not be in the interest of Poland nor of the EU, given the many
crises with which Europe is already struggling to cope.
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